Do Structurally Anti-Memetic Truths Exist?

The Question

[!question] Are there necessarily true and valuable ideas that are structurally anti-memetic—i.e., that have low fitness not because of social costs or randomness, but because their information-theoretic properties make them unlikely to survive cultural transmission?

Why It Matters

If the answer is yes, we face a systematic epistemic blind spot. Important truths would be selected against by cultural evolution, not because they’re wrong or useless, but because they don’t compress well or require rare priors to decode.

This would mean:

• Rationality training is fighting cultural selection pressure
• Some domains of knowledge are harder to learn not because they’re complex, but because the ideas don’t “fit” human cognitive infrastructure
• We should actively search for anti-memetic truths in the spaces where good memes don’t exist

Context

The dissertation establishes that [[Meme Fitness Correlates with Compressibility]]. If true, then by contrapositive, incompressible ideas have low fitness.

But is incompressibility correlated with truth/value? Three possibilities:

1. No correlation: Truth is independent of compressibility. Then anti-memetic truths exist by chance alone.
2. Negative correlation: Truth is positively correlated with compressibility (reality has structure; true ideas leverage that structure; leveraging structure enables compression). Then anti-memetic truths are rare.
3. Positive correlation: Truth is negatively correlated with compressibility (the universe is more complex than our intuitions; true ideas require more bits). Then anti-memetic truths are common and important.

Related Concepts

• [[Meme Fitness Correlates with Compressibility]]
• [[Anti-Meme Taxonomy]]
• [[Conditional Entropy and Prior Requirements]]

Possible Approaches

Approach 1: Existence Proof via Kolmogorov Complexity

Try to show that for any reasonable definition of “important truth,” there exist truths with Kolmogorov complexity exceeding human cognitive bandwidth.

Pros: Would give a strong existence result.

Cons: Kolmogorov complexity is uncomputable; we’d need approximations. Also, high K-complexity doesn’t necessarily mean low compressibility given human priors.

Approach 2: Empirical Identification

Find candidate anti-memetic truths by:

• Looking for ideas that experts endorse but laypeople reject
• Identifying truths that are simple to state but hard to believe (high conditional entropy given common priors)

Pros: Concrete examples are persuasive.

Cons: How do we distinguish “anti-memetic truth” from “truth that hasn’t spread yet”?

Approach 3: Information-Theoretic Argument

Model the space of true propositions and the space of transmissible propositions. Show that the intersection is a strict subset—some truths lie outside the transmissible region.

Pros: Would be a clean theoretical result.

Cons: Requires formalizing “truth” and “transmissibility” in a common framework.

What Would Answer This

• A proof that the set {true propositions} ∩ {high-fitness memes} is strictly smaller than {true propositions}
• A collection of well-documented examples where true ideas failed to spread due to structural properties (not social/political suppression)
• A negative result showing that all important truths can be compressed to transmissible forms (this would answer “no”)

Partial Progress

Candidate anti-memetic truths identified so far:

1. Base rate neglect: Simple concept, but requires Bayesian mental machinery most lack
2. Opportunity cost: Every choice has invisible costs; requires counterfactual simulation
3. Selection effects: You only see survivors; requires simulating unobserved populations
4. Exponential dynamics: Compound growth/decay; requires non-linear intuition
5. The map-territory distinction: Your model isn’t reality; requires meta-cognition

All of these are:

• Low Kolmogorov complexity (statable in a sentence)
• High conditional entropy given typical priors (require cognitive operations most people don’t naturally perform)
• Demonstrably important for good reasoning
• Persistently misunderstood despite widespread teaching efforts

This is suggestive but not conclusive.

If Answered Positively

• We should expect systematic gaps in common knowledge
• Education should focus on installing the priors needed to decode anti-memetic truths, not just transmitting conclusions
• AI systems could help by identifying and amplifying anti-memetic truths
• We should be humble: the ideas we find compelling are filtered by memetic fitness, not just truth

If Answered Negatively

• All truths are in principle transmissible; failure is due to contingent factors (effort, attention, incentives)
• The compression thesis still holds but doesn’t create blind spots
• Educational failures are not structural but addressable

Related Questions

• [[What Is the Information-Theoretic Structure of Belief Revision?]]
• [[Can AI Systems Detect Anti-Memetic Truths?]]
• [[How Do Institutions Compensate for Anti-Memetic Ideas?]]

Notes

Working hypothesis: anti-memetic truths cluster in domains where:

1. The truth contradicts evolutionarily-installed intuitions (scope insensitivity, availability bias)
2. Understanding requires holding multiple abstractions in mind simultaneously
3. The implications are emotionally uncomfortable and complex (not just uncomfortable)

Need to formalize this into testable predictions.